Three recent reports involving Georgia's Division of Family and Children Services raise different concerns, but together they present a larger question for policymakers: Is DFCS exercising powers beyond those the General Assembly expressly authorized, and are existing safeguards sufficient to protect children, families and taxpayers?
DFCS has one of the most important responsibilities in state government — protecting children who are abused, neglected or endangered. That mission sometimes requires swift and decisive intervention. But the seriousness of that responsibility also makes clearly defined legal authority and independent oversight essential.
Recent reporting by The Center Square found that DFCS purchased sophisticated technology reportedly capable of tracking cellphones, gathering online information and conducting electronic forensic investigations. The report raised questions about whether a child welfare agency possesses statutory authority to independently use investigative tools more commonly associated with law enforcement.
Georgia law unquestionably authorizes DFCS to investigate allegations of child abuse and neglect. O.C.G.A. § 49-5-8 establishes DFCS's protective-services responsibilities and contemplates bringing appropriate matters to law enforcement, the courts or other agencies. What is less clear is where Georgia law expressly authorizes DFCS itself to exercise law-enforcement-style electronic surveillance powers such as cellphone location tracking or forensic extraction of electronic devices.
That distinction is significant. The authority to investigate allegations of abuse does not necessarily confer every investigative power available to law enforcement. Law enforcement's use of intrusive investigative techniques may involve probable cause, warrants and judicial review. If DFCS is independently exercising comparable powers, the General Assembly should determine the statutory authority under which those powers are being exercised and whether equivalent safeguards exist.
A second report by The Center Square raises a different authority and oversight question involving technology procurement. According to the report, DFCS spent approximately $7.3 million over three years on a case-management system known as Argo. An audit found that service-authorization expenditures increased from $63.3 million in fiscal year 2022 to $134.4 million in fiscal year 2025 — an increase of approximately $71.1 million. DFCS subsequently stopped using the system, and expenditures have reportedly declined.
The unanswered procurement questions are important because DFCS is not operating outside Georgia's statewide technology-governance structure. O.C.G.A. § 50-25-4 gives the Georgia Technology Authority broad responsibilities over state technology, including establishing technology and security standards and overseeing aspects of technology acquisition by state agencies. The question is not simply whether DFCS purchased software — it is whether the required procurement and technology-review processes were followed, whether GTA reviewed or approved the technology, and who was responsible for monitoring the expenditure as costs increased.
A third and potentially more consequential authority question is now before the Georgia Supreme Court. The Georgia Recorder reported on the case of a Fulton County mother whose two children were removed by DFCS following the death of their 13-year-old sibling. According to court records, DFCS acknowledged in its emergency-removal paperwork that the surviving children were not in immediate danger. A juvenile court initially rejected the agency's request. DFCS subsequently submitted another emergency request, which was granted. At a hearing days later, a DFCS caseworker testified that there was no evidence the surviving children had been abused or neglected and that "upper leadership" wanted the children removed. The juvenile court ordered the children immediately returned to their mother.
These three matters involve different facts and different areas of law. None proves wrongdoing in another. But together they present an important institutional question for the General Assembly: an agency's mission does not itself define the limits of its legal authority. The General Assembly does.
As your representative, I am asking these questions on your behalf: What provision of Georgia law authorizes DFCS to independently conduct electronic surveillance? What statutory authority governs removal when DFCS itself determines that a child is not in immediate danger? What judicial safeguards apply before government separates a child from a parent when no emergency exists? What GTA review or approval applied to the technology DFCS purchased? And who ultimately has responsibility for ensuring that DFCS remains within the authority granted to it by the General Assembly?
These questions are not an argument for weakening child protection. They are an argument for strengthening it. Children who are genuinely abused, neglected or endangered need DFCS to act quickly and effectively. Families also deserve the protections provided by Georgia law and the Constitution. And taxpayers deserve assurance that millions of dollars in technology purchases receive the oversight required by law.
Protecting children and protecting constitutional rights are not competing responsibilities. A properly functioning child welfare system must do both. The General Assembly now has an opportunity to examine whether Georgia law draws those boundaries clearly enough — and, where it does, whether they are being followed.
